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Abstract
To what extent do different firms follow different wage policies? How do such policies af-
fect worker mobility between firms, and what are the effects of different wage bargaining
regimes? The empirical branch of personnel economics has long been hampered by a lack
of representative data sets. Norway is one of a handful of countries that has produced rich
linked employer–employee data suitable for such analysis. This paper has three parts. First,
we describe the wage setting and employment protection institutions in Norway. Next, we
describe the Norwegian data sets. Finally, we document a large number of stylized facts
regarding wage structure and labor mobility within and between Norwegian firms. Our main
data set covers white-collar workers in the manufacturing and private sectors for the period
1980–1997. We also have blue-collar data for the 1986–1997 period covering the core of the
manufacturing sector. Information about occupations, monthly wages, hours worked and
bonuses is available, as well as various worker and firm characteristics.
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1 Introduction
In the 1980s and 1990s, most Western European countries broke the trend of increasing the size
of the welfare state and the use of solidaristic wage policies that were developed in the 1950s
and continued through the 1970s. Increased and persistent unemployment and budget deficits
led many countries to question the size of the welfare state and egalitarian wage policies. Also,
Scandinavian countries—most notably Sweden—were forced to reassess their welfare policies,
and centralized wage negotiations were abandoned. Norway went in a different direction and
resisted the trend observed in other developed countries in this period. In the early 1980s,
wages were negotiated at the industry level, but in 1986/87, bargaining was further centralized
to the national level. In the early 1990s, the so-called “solidarity alternative” wage policy
was introduced. This strengthened the guarantied negotiated minimum wage for the lowest
paid (Wallerstein et al., 1997; Kahn, 1998; Freeman, 1997). It is notable that the earnings
distribution did not increase as in most other countries but stayed compressed until the mid
1990s (Aaberge et al., 2000).1 The return to education in Norway is fairly low and stable.
OLS estimates from Mincer regressions suggest that the marginal return to one extra year of
education is about 5 percent, see e.g. Barth and Røed (2001).
Because of high wage compression and strong labor market institutions, the Norwegian
economy differs from most other Western economies. However, we do not know much about
the precise workings of the labor market in Norway. To what extent do different firms follow
different wage policies? Do such differences relate to how workers move between firms? What
are the effects of different wage bargaining regimes? The empirical branch of personnel
economics has long been hampered by a lack of representative data sets. Norway is one of a
handful of countries that has produced rich linked employer–employee data suitable for such
analysis.2 A special feature of our data is detailed information on occupational hierarchies
and very detailed information on wage compensation for normal hours and overtime, as well
as bonuses. There is also very good information on hours worked. We match these data to
the main register-based employer–employee data set, containing detailed information on firm
and worker characteristics.3
Our paper is very descriptive in nature, and it should be read as a detailed country study
together with the other country studies in this volume. The paper has three parts. First,
we describe the wage setting and employment protection institutions in Norway. Next, we
describe the Norwegian data sets. Finally, we document a large number of stylized facts
1See Kahn (1998) and Hægeland et al. (1999) for explanations for the increased wage compression.
2Some work on both the job and worker turnover and wage structure has been undertaken before, but
very little has been conducted on wage mobility within and between firms. See Salvanes (1997), Salvanes and
Førre (2003) and Margolis and Salvanes (2001).
3See Møen et al. (2004) for a description of the main employer–employee data set used in several previous
studies.
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regarding wage structure and labor mobility within and between Norwegian firms. We cover
the period 1980–1997. One topic analyzed is within and between firm wage dispersion, and
whether wage dispersion has been stable over time. Although overall wage dispersion has
been stable, there might still have been changes in the individual components of the variance
both across firms and across worker groups. There might also have been increased sorting of
workers across firms. We document these types of patterns and also those of worker mobility
for different groups of firms and workers. A unique feature of our data is that we can compare
mobility across occupations within firms for white-collar workers as opposed to the more
standard mobility patterns across firms. Another feature is the ability to compare wage and
worker mobility for white- and blue-collar workers separately. The wage setting institutions
are very different for white- and blue-collar workers. There is no centrally bargained wage for
white-collar workers, whereas blue-collar workers have a two-tier system with both national (or
industry) and firm-level negotiations. In this way, we have an extra institutional “experiment”
within the country. Furthermore, the period we analyze was volatile in terms of business
cycle movements. Hence our data are well suited for studying the cyclical pattern of wage
and worker mobility.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the macroe-
conomic conditions in the period we are analyzing. Section 3 presents the institutional setting
in Norway, and Section 4 presents the data we are using. In Section 5, we look at the wage
structure and labor mobility in detail. Section 6 summarizes our empirical findings.
2 Macroeconomic conditions
Table 1 and Figure 1 show unemployment and growth rates for Norway for each of the years
from 1972 to 2002. We see that the macroeconomic conditions have not been stable in the
period covered by our analysis, 1980–1997. There was a mild downturn in the early 1980s,
with a peak in the business cycle around 1985–87. The unemployment rate was then about 2%
of the labor force. From 1988 onwards, Norway experienced its worst economic recession in
the postwar period, when the unemployment rate was about 6%. After 1993, growth picked
up, and 1997 was a peak year in the relatively stable period after the mid 1990s. Given
these business cycle fluctuations, we have picked 1981 and 1993 as two low-growth years and
1986/87 and 1997 as two high-growth years in our empirical analysis.
The Norwegian Government plays an important part in coordinating wage settlements,
and this had important implications for wage determination in the period analyzed. For
instance, wage negotiations in 1988 were undertaken with considerable concern about the
future of the Norwegian economy. Partly because of the oil price fall in 1986, the Norwegian
krone had been devalued by 10% in May 1986. The largest employer association, NAF, the
predecessor of NHO (the Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry), called a lock-out
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Table 1: Macroeconomic conditions: unemployment and economic growth.
Year Unemployment ratea Economic growth (% change in GDP)b
1 year 2 year 5 year
1971 . 5.00 . .
1972 1.7 4.97 4.99 .
1973 1.5 4.32 4.64 .
1974 1.5 4.11 4.21 .
1975 2.3 5.10 4.60 4.70
1976 2.0 5.70 5.40 4.84
1977 1.0 4.18 4.94 4.68
1978 1.8 3.43 3.80 4.50
1979 2.0 4.38 3.91 4.56
1980 1.7 4.83 4.61 4.50
1981 2.0 0.96 2.90 3.56
1982 2.6 0.21 0.58 2.76
1983 3.4 3.52 1.86 2.78
1984 3.2 5.74 4.63 3.05
1985 2.6 5.07 5.40 3.10
1986 2.0 3.54 4.30 3.61
1987 2.1 2.03 2.79 3.98
1988 3.2 -0.04 1.00 3.27
1989 4.9 0.95 0.45 2.31
1990 5.2 2.06 1.51 1.71
1991 5.5 3.55 2.81 1.71
1992 5.9 3.25 3.40 1.95
1993 6.0 2.69 2.97 2.50
1994 5.4 5.12 3.91 3.33
1995 4.9 4.27 4.69 3.78
1996 4.8 5.12 4.69 4.09
1997 4.0 5.06 5.09 4.45
1998 3.2 2.60 3.83 4.43
1999 3.2 2.11 2.35 3.83
2000 3.4 2.80 2.45 3.54
2001 3.6 1.91 2.35 2.89
2002 3.9 0.95 1.43 2.07
aThe unemployment rate is taken from the Norwegian Labour Force Survey
(AKU) published by Statistics Norway (1974, 1978, 1984, 1997 and 2003a).
bThe growth numbers are computed based on numbers from Statistics Norway
(2003b). In the computation the GDP numbers are fixed at 2000 prices. The formula
used is growthGDP = 100(lnGDPt − lnGDPt−yr)/yr where t = 1971, . . . , 2002 and
yr ∈ {1, 2, 5}.
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Figure 1: Unemployment rate and 1-year growth rate GDP.
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that failed, largely because of disagreement among the employers. This lead to reductions in
work time and high increases in wages in 1986. After the subsequent downturn in the economy,
the main labor union, LO (the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions) and NAF/NHO
agreed to a moderate wage increase in 1988. To ensure that all groups followed suit, the
Storting (the Norwegian national assembly) passed a law that wages could not increase by
more than 5%, in line with the outcome of the wage settlements between LO and NHO. A
similar law was passed in 1989. Therefore, a wage freeze policy at 5% nominal increase was
in place in these two years.
In 1990, the income regulation laws expired, yet the LO and NHO agreed that wage
increases should still be moderate, because of high unemployment and the weak competitive
position of the trading sector. In 1992, the agreement among the labor market organizations
on wage restraint was formalized in the Solidarity Alternative. In 1994, a major revision
was undertaken by industry, yet wage growth was moderate, following the lead from the
metal industry. In 1996 and 1998, however, proposed agreements in line with the Solidarity
Alternative were rejected in ballots. This led to strikes and subsequent agreements on higher
wage growth.
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3 Institutional setting
This section describes wage setting institutions in Norway for different worker groups and
institutions for employment protection.
3.1 Wage setting
In the private sector in Norway, about half of the labor force is covered by collective agreements
(Stokke et al., 2003).4 Union density, i.e., the share of employees who are members of a union,
is somewhat lower: 43% in the private sector (Stokke et al., 2003). These figures were very
stable in the period we analyze (Wallerstein et al., 1997). Bargaining coverage is higher than
union density because firms covered by a collective agreement follow the agreement for all
employees. However, in contrast to many other European countries, extension mechanisms
imposing regulations from collective agreements onto the non-unionized sectors, are not used
in Norway.
The largest employees’ association is LO, to which about half of all union members belong.
The traditional stronghold of LO is among blue-collar workers in the manufacturing indus-
try, but LO is also prominent in some private service sectors, and for non-professionals and
unskilled employees in the public sector. LO is organized as union branches, to a large degree
covering different industry sectors. Other employees’ associations are YS (The Confederation
of Vocational Unions), covering many of the same workers as LO; UHO (The Confederation
of Higher Education Unions), covering teachers, nurses, the police, etc; and Akademikerne
(The Federation of Norwegian Professional Associations), covering employees with higher ed-
ucation. On the employers’ side, NHO is the dominant association in the private sector,
being the main counterpart of the LO. NHO has about 16,000 member companies, employing
about 490,000 employees in Norway (Stokke et al., 2003), i.e., about one quarter of the total
workforce of 2.3 million.
For employees covered by collective agreements, wage setting takes place at two levels
national (or industry) and at the firm level (wage drift). Central negotiations concern col-
lective agreements, wage regulations, working hours, working conditions, pensions, medical
benefits, etc. Firm-level negotiations determine possible local adjustments and additions to
the collective agreements. These negotiations are generally conducted under a peace clause,
preventing strikes and lock-outs within the contract period of the collective (i.e., central)
agreements (Holden, 1998). Collective agreements usually last for two years. Since 1964, the
main revisions to the collective agreements have been undertaken every second year, in even
years (most recently in 2004). The draft agreement in a main revision is subject to a ballot
among union members. Occasionally, draft agreements are rejected by the members, leading
4See Holden and Salvanes (2005) on more details on the wage setting process.
6
to a strike and subsequent negotiations during or after the strike. There are also central
negotiations in intermediate years, but the scope for these negotiations is usually limited to
wages only. Furthermore, negotiations in intermediate years are undertaken at the national
level, without any ballot requirements, which usually ensures a more moderate wage outcome.
Broadly, we can distinguish three types of collective agreements:
• minimum wage agreements,
• normal wage agreements, and
• agreements without wage rates.
Most workers are covered by minimum wage agreements, which specify minimum wage
rates, as well as other working conditions. For these workers, there are local negotiations about
additions to the central agreements. Importantly, as the local agreements specify additions to
the central agreements, an increase in the centrally specified minimum wage rates raises the
wage of all workers, even if they are paid more than the minimum rates. Workers covered by
normal wage agreements are not supposed to have local wage negotiations, so their wages and
working conditions are fully specified by the central agreements. At the opposite end, there
are also agreements without wage rates, specifying only procedures for the local wage setting.
These agreements are only used for white-collar workers. Hence, an important feature of the
Norwegian wage setting is that white-collar wages are mainly set at the firm level and thus
reflect conditions at the firm level. It should also be noted that there is no national, statutory
minimum wage for all workers in Norway. Minimum wages only apply to workers covered by
collective agreements.
Although blue-collar wages are negotiated centrally, there is considerable variation be-
tween sectors with regard to the number of firms with local bargaining, and the importance
of the wage drift—the change in wages due to local negotiations. Figure 2 shows the total
wage change in the period 1970–1996 for blue-collar workers. As can be seen from the figure,
quite a large proportion of total wage gains is realized at the local level; see also Holden and
Rødseth (1990). This means that the sector minimum wage will not be binding for several
firms, since they have locally contracted higher wages. In our data, a relatively small pro-
portion of the workforce is paid at or near the minimum wage, and local bargaining could be
one reason why this is so.
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Figure 2: Total wage change in Norway decomposed by national (or industry) and locally
bargained wage in the private sector in Norway. Source: “Det tekniske beregningsutvalget
for inntekts-oppgjørene.”
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3.2 Employment protection5
Rules regarding individual and collective dismissals, as well as those about the flexibility
of industrial plants with respect to temporary hiring and the use of subcontractors, are
important aspects of employment protection and thus the costs of adjustment for firms. The
different types of constraints regulating the hiring and firing of workers are not completely
transparent, since, in addition to national laws, collective agreements between employers
and workers’ organizations are also very important in regulating the adjustment of the labor
factor. These agreements may differ across industries and workers, depending upon workers’
age, tenure, etc.
Two main laws govern the labor relations in Norway: The law on employment (“Sysselset-
tingsloven”) and the law on labor relations (“Arbeidsmiljøloven”). The law on employment
mainly regulates changes in labor during a period of restructuring and mass lay-offs by the
firm. The latter was enacted in 1982, and it includes standards for general working conditions,
overtime regulations and legal regulation for employment protection. According to the law on
labor relations, dismissals for individual reasons are limited to cases of disloyalty, persistent
5A new law of employment protection and the use of time-limited labor contracts has been proposed by the
government and is to be decided upon in 2005. The main proposals are to allow more flexible use of fixed-term
contracts and more flexible use of overtime work.
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absenteeism, etc. In general, it is possible, but very difficult, to replace an individual worker
in a given job with another worker. Hence, there is strong employment protection in Norway.
The law on employment states that the general rule for laying off a worker for economic reasons
is that it can occur only when the job is “redundant” and the worker cannot be retained in
another capacity. This regulation covers all workers regardless of how long they have been
employed. Requirements for collective dismissals in Norway basically follow the common
minimum standards for EU-countries. It is important to note that a firm can dismiss workers
not only when it is making a loss but also when it is performing poorly. There is no actual
rule on the selection of workers to be dismissed. However, the legal practice narrows down
which workers can be dismissed. Conversations with lawyers in the employees’ organizations
indicate that many, if not most, dismissal cases are taken to court. This is costly for firms.
When it comes to other costs of dismissal, the employment law states that employment
is terminable with one month’s notice for workers with tenure of less than or equal to five
years. This one-month notice period is at the lower end of the spectrum compared to many
countries. However, most workers have a three-months’-notice requirement for both parties to
the contract. Although there is no generalized legal requirement for severance pay in Norway,
agreements in the private sector require lump-sum payments to workers aged between 50 and
55. As an example, in the contract between LO and NHO, a worker who is 50 and has been
working for 10 consecutive years in the firm, or 20 years in total, is eligible for one to two
months’ pay. Similar agreements exist for the other unions. Some EU-countries have even
stronger job protection rules, including, for instance, general compensation, a social plan for
re-training or transfer to another plant within a firm. Although not mandatory, some of these
other requirements are also commonplace in Norway. Note finally that while some costs of
reducing the workforce (such as redundancy payments) are related to the size of the reduction,
others (such as advance notice requirements, legal and other administrative costs) may have
significant fixed components.
The workforce flexibility of an economy can be enhanced by allowing fixed-term contracts
in addition to standard contracts, and by the use of temporary work agencies. In many OECD
countries, there has been a strong trend towards liberalizing the use of these two schemes.
In Norway, the use of fixed-term contracts is allowed only for limited situations, such as
specific projects, seasonal work or the replacement of workers who are absent temporarily.
However, it is not as restrictive as it appears, since defining a specific project for a firm is
partly open to discretion. Repeated temporary contracts are possible with some limitations,
and there is no rule limiting the accumulated duration of successive contracts. In general, the
use of temporary work agencies is prohibited, but substantial latitude exists for service sector
occupations. Restrictions for the number of renewals exist, and two years is the maximum
for accumulated contracts. Compared to other OECD countries, Norway is ranked a little bit
above average for the strictness of the use of temporary employment (OECD, 1999). Very
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few comparative studies of the overall degree of employment protection exist. A much-cited
study by Emerson (1987) ranks Italy as having the strongest employment protection rules,
while the UK, and on some criteria, Denmark are at the other end of the spectrum. Norway is
ranked together with Sweden, France and to a lesser extent Germany (when all regulations are
taken together) as an intermediate country with a fairly high degree of protection. Obviously,
intercountry comparisons are difficult. The most recent comparison was made by the OECD
in 1999, where Norway was ranked at number 12 out of 19 OECD countries in the late 1980s,
and as number 19 out of 26 OECD countries in the late 1990s in the degree of restrictiveness
(OECD, 1999). Evidence on the flexibility of the Norwegian economy from job and worker
flows data suggests that it is about average for OECD countries, although worker flows are a
bit below average (Salvanes, 1997 and Salvanes and Førre, 2003). The overall impression is
that legislation, contracts, and common practice impose important additional costs in Norway
when adjusting the labor force downward, and possibly upward as well. See Nilsen, Salvanes
and Sciantarelli (2003) for an analysis of the effect of labor adjustment costs in Norway.
4 Data
Like other Scandinavian countries, Norway has rich and high-quality linked employer–employee
data sets. The sources and structure are basically the same as the data sets used in Denmark,
Sweden and France. The basis of the Norwegian data is administrative files from Statistics
Norway and plant-level information from the annual census for manufacturing plus a similar
data set for private and public service sectors. Information on R&D and trade statistics has
been added as well. See Møen et al. (2004) and Salvanes and Førre (2003) for a general
description of the Norwegian linked employer–employee data sets.
In this paper, we take advantage of two new data sets, one for white-collar workers and
one for blue-collar workers. We can match these to the linked employer–employee data as
they both use the same series of person identifiers. Both these data sets are from NHO,
the main employers’ association in Norway. The white-collar data set is the main data set
used in this paper. Its main advantage over data that has been available so far is that it
contains information on hourly wages, overtime hours, pay, and bonus pay as well as detailed
information on occupations. The main employer–employee data set contains only information
on annual earnings and education, but none about occupations.
4.1 White-collar data
The white-collar data contain employment and wage data information from NHO, which has
about 16,000 member companies. 73% of these companies have fewer than 20 person-years
(both blue and white collar workers). The member companies employ about 450,000 workers,
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mainly in construction, services and manufacturing in Norway (NHO, 2004).6 There is a
bias towards manufacturing. Many of the member companies in NHO operate in export and
import competing industries. The total labor force in Norway is about 2.3 million workers, of
whom about half were employed in the public sector in the year 2000, hence the NHO covers
roughly 40% of private sector employment. In terms of private-sector GDP, the members of
NHO produce about 40%.
The data is based on establishment records for all white-collar workers employed by firms
that are members of the NHO confederation. Norwegian law requires all employers to report
data on wages and employment annually to Statistics Norway. Until 1997, NHO collected
data for their member plants under this law, and Statistics Norway collected data for the rest
of the economy. From 1997, Statistics Norway collected data from all sectors. The data set is
considered to be very precise, since the wage data were a major source of information for the
collective bargaining process in Norway between the NHO and the unions. See Holden and
Salvanes (2005) for an assessment of the wage data from this source as compared to other
sources of earnings data from Norwegian registers.
Our data cover an average of 97,000 white-collar workers per year in different industries
during the period 1980–1997.7 CEOs (and in large firms, vice CEOs) are in principle not
included. The average number of plants is 5,000 and the average number of firms is 2,700 per
year.
As mentioned, we have merged the NHO data set with the main administrative matched
employer–employee database. This database contains a rich set of information on workers and
plants for the period 1986–2002. In principle, this merging allows us to identify CEOs and vice
CEOs indirectly. One of the reasons for merging the NHO data set with the administrative
register, besides obtaining more information, is that it is unclear whether the information
reported in the NHO statistics pertains to plants, firms or a combination of the two.8 Cf
Section 4.3 for how this problem is solved. On average, we could match 97% of workers with
plants and 93% with firms.
4.1.1 Main variables
In this section, we briefly describe some of the most important variables in the white-collar
worker data set.
6Note that this data set is very similar to the Swedish data set used in Oyer (2005) and the Finnish one
used in Uusitalo and Vartiainen (2005).
7The year 1987 is missing. However, the data set for each year contains lagged values; hence, we were able
to reconstruct 1987 by using lagged values in the 1988 file. This is of course not a perfect reconstruction, since
we do not have information on workers who left the data set in 1987 and were not in the 1988 file.
8The register data covers the year 1986 and onwards, and the merging between the NHO data set and the
register data is almost perfect. However, we do not have register data for the years 1980–1985. In order to
construct the link between workers and plants in this period, we used various methods. Important sources of
information were the job start date in the 1986 register data and the links provided in the 1980 census data.
11
Occupation Each worker is assigned an occupational group and a level within the occupa-
tional group. The groups are labeled A–F: Group A is technical white-collar workers; Group
B is foremen; Group C is administration; Group D is shops and Group E is storage. Group F
is a miscellaneous group consisting of workers that do not fit in any of the other categories.
Hierarchical level is given by a number where zero represents the top level. The number of
levels defined varies by group and ranges from 1 (F) to 7 (A). Table 2 shows the distribution
of workers on the occupational groups. These codes are made by NHO for wage bargaining
purposes, and as such they are similar across firms and industries. That information is one of
the unique features of this data set, and it gives us a picture of how the hierarchical structure
looks within each firm. For example, we are able to study mobility within a firm and questions
related to promotion.
Table 2: Distribution of the workers on the occupational groups.
Year
Occupational group 1981 1986 1993 1997
A0 0.40 0.50 0.51 0.55
A1 2.18 2.58 3.69 4.13
A2 4.80 6.50 6.91 6.89
A31 4.44 5.22 4.34 4.64
A32 5.66 6.64 8.76 8.34
A41 1.45 1.63 1.36 1.19
A42 7.30 7.34 7.34 8.43
A5 4.83 4.80 4.08 4.61
A6 1.79 1.68 1.61 1.33
B1 0.59 0.54 0.68 0.76
B2 2.24 1.93 1.95 1.92
B3 11.96 9.16 7.27 6.35
C0 0.91 1.02 1.07 1.11
C1 5.54 5.51 6.59 6.41
C2 8.82 9.80 10.33 10.61
C3 13.34 14.09 14.60 13.89
C4 9.88 7.92 6.28 5.80
D1 0.33 0.24 0.36 0.29
D2 0.96 0.68 0.92 0.86
E1 1.44 1.20 0.93 0.79
E2 3.04 2.91 1.81 1.91
F 8.09 8.10 8.63 9.20
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
We define an occupation as a combination of group and level. That gives us 22 occupa-
tions.9 To create a single hierarchy within a firm, we aggregate the 22 different occupations
9In the data set we also have a much richer set of four-digit job codes. These are less consistently used
across firms and perhaps also within firms across time. We have therefore not yet utilized this information.
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into seven different levels. This gives a maximum of seven levels in a single firm.10 To help
in the aggregation, we have carefully utilized the NHO’s descriptions of the different occu-
pational groups. Still, such a harmonization across occupational groups is difficult. One
problem lies in the fact that some levels are overlapping with respect to responsibility in the
organization. For example, even though we aggregate occupational Groups A31 and A32 into
the same level (see Table 3), we know that they differ in responsibility, since A31 involves
management of other workers while A32 does not (however, they are both ranked above the
A4 level). Furthermore, the levels defined within each group do not necessarily align; e.g.,
level 1 within Group B seems closest to level 1 within Group A, but also overlaps with level
2. Level 2 within Group B is closest to level 3 within Group A, but also overlaps with level
2. Table 4 shows the distribution of workers on the seven levels. Note that in terms of white-
collar workers, the typical firm is not “pyramid shaped”. Most workers are at the middle
levels.
Table 3: Harmonization of the levels.
Level Occupational groups
7 (top) A0, C0
6 A1, B1, C1
5 A2
4 A31, A32, B2, C2
3 A41, A42, B3, C3, D1, E1
2 A5, F, D2, E2
1 (bottom) A6, C4
Table 4: Distribution of the workers on the harmonized levels.
Year
Level 1981 1986 1993 1997
7 (top) 1.32 1.52 1.58 1.66
6 8.31 8.62 10.95 11.30
5 4.80 6.50 6.91 6.89
4 21.16 23.59 25.38 25.50
3 35.82 33.67 31.85 30.94
2 16.92 16.49 15.44 16.58
1 (bottom) 11.67 9.61 7.89 7.13
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Wage We use monthly salary (on September 1st) for white-collar workers including the
value of fringe benefits and excluding overtime and bonuses. Indirect costs to the firm such as
10Note that not all firms will have workers on each of the seven levels.
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payroll tax, pensions etc are not included. We transform nominal wages to real wages using
the Consumer Price Index with base year 1990 (Statistics Norway, 2004).
Hours The hours reported in the data are average normal hours per week exclusive of lunches
and overtime.
Bonuses This variable gives the monthly average value of bonuses, commissions and pro-
duction bonuses during the 12 months prior to September 1st.
Tenure To create the tenure variable, we used the job start variable that is present in the
administrative register data.
4.1.2 Restrictions on the sample
We put the following restrictions on the sample:
1. To remove outliers in the data, we imposed the restriction that the monthly wage should
be at least 2,000 NOK measured in 1980 kroner.
2. The number of hours worked per week is 30 or above, i.e., we look at full-time workers.
3. The number of full-time workers in each firm is at least 25 in year t.
4. The number of full-time workers in each firm is at least 25 in year t− 1.11
Since our data set only contains white-collar workers, this means that we are looking at
large firms by Norwegian standards. In 1993, a firm with 25 full-time white-collar workers
had on average 60 blue-collar workers. Table 5 shows the effect of our restrictions on the
number of workers and firms.
4.2 Blue-collar data12
Our blue-collar data set was obtained from TBL, Teknologibedriftenes Landsforening, (the
Federation of Norwegian Manufacturing Industries). TBL is by far the largest federation
within NHO. As of December 2003, TBL has about 1,150 member companies employing about
66,000 workers. The member companies operate in industrial sectors ranging from mechanical
and electrical engineering to information technology, furnishing and textile industries (TBL,
2004). The data set covers blue-collar workers only, and consists of quarterly observations
for the period 1986–1998, i.e., a span of 13 years.13 Each quarter covers on average 34,000
11This restriction, agreed on by all project members present at an NBER-meeting in Boston in April 2004,
introduces a selection bias in the entry and exit rates related to firms crossing the 25 worker threshold.
12Since these data are used only in a small part of our analysis, this description will be somewhat briefer
than our description of the white-collar data.
13The 4th quarter of 1987 is missing.
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Table 5: The effect (i.e. the difference between each row in the table) of the restrictions on
the number of white collar workers (top panel) and firms in the sample.
1981 1986 1993 1997
No restrictions 74,075 91,911 100,087 111,336
Outliers 74,074 91,896 99,648 110,516
Hours per week ≥ 30 73,776 91,695 94,404 104,899
Firmsize ≥ 25 in year t 60,657 78,587 80,831 87,533
Firmsize ≥ 25 in year t− 1 56,838 73,600 76,449 79,259
1981 1986 1993 1997
No restrictions 2,348 2,622 2,682 3,838
Outliers 2,348 2,622 2,638 3,715
Hours per week ≥ 30 2,327 2,614 2,509 3,518
Firmsize ≥ 25 in year t 532 591 586 679
Firmsize ≥ 25 in year t− 1 467 506 521 565
workers. Examples of principal variables are pay (fixed, piece and overtime), and hours
worked (regular hours, piece hours and overtime). Each worker is classified on the basis of a
3-digit code describing which working group the worker belongs to, i.e., we have information
on what kind of job the worker is doing.
We have linked these data to information from administrative registers in the same way
as we have linked the white-collar data, cf Section 4.1.
4.2.1 Merging blue- and white-collar data
A logical next step is to merge the blue- and white-collar data sets to get one sample with
information about whole firms. This is possible since TBL is a member of NHO. Hence, the
firms in our blue-collar data set are a subsample of the firms in our white-collar data set.
Most member firms in TBL belong to Sector 38 (Manufacture of fabricated metal products,
machinery and equipment). We therefore have constrained the merging of blue- and white-
collar data to this sector.14 When combining the data, we have adjusted for the fact that some
of the information is not directly comparable. For example, the TBL data report quarterly
wage while the NHO data report monthly wage. Also, since the TBL data span 1986–1998
and the NHO data span 1980–1997, we are restricted to the period 1986–1997.
After cleaning up the merged sample by removing firms with only blue-collar or white-
collar workers and putting the same restrictions on the sample as given in Section 4.1.2, we
are left with a sample of 24,268 workers in 1987, 26,805 in 1993 and 25,446 in 1997. Numbers
of firms are 119, 149 and 139 respectively. This implies that we are able to link approximately
14When talking about blue-collar workers in this paper, we mean blue-collar workers in Sector 38.
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25% of the NHO firms with TBL firms.15
4.3 Defining plant and firm
In this subsection, we explain briefly how we were able to link employees to plants and
firms—a link that is crucial. Both the white- and blue-collar data set contain an employer
identification number, which is the employer’s member number in TBL (blue-collar data) or
NHO (white-collar data).16 It has not been possible to establish whether this employer iden-
tification represents a plant, a firm or a combination of the two. It is also unclear how plant
and firm restructuring is handled. To overcome these obstacles, we take advantage of the
National Employer–Employee register, which links employers and employees for administra-
tive purposes related to tax and social benefits.17 The Employer–Employee register uses the
same person identification number as our white- and blue-collar data sets. Hence we use the
person identification number as the merging variable when adding plant and firm information
from the Employer–Employee register.18 In fact, the person identification number is the key
variable that allows us to merge the new data sets with other firm and worker information to
which we have access.
5 Results
In this section, we provide detailed descriptive measures of the wage structure and wage mo-
bility in Norway for both blue- and white-collar workers for the years 1981, 1986/87, 1993
and 1997. These years comprise two peak years and two trough years in the business cycle
as explained in Section 2. The white-collar results consist of all white-collar workers covered
by NHO and includes both manufacturing and private services. When we assess both white-
and blue-collar workers working in the same firms, we are restricted to one sector within
manufacturing only: manufacture of fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment
(Sector 38). This sector comprises about half of the labor force in the manufacturing sector
and both high-tech and low-tech firms as explained in Section 4.2. It is important to distin-
guish between the wage structures for white-collar and blue-collar workers in Norway, since
the institutional setting for wage determination is quite different in the private sector. As
15This number is approximate since we look at the number of firms after imposing the restrictions in Section
4.1.2.
16The member numbers in TBL and NHO are not compatible.
17To be precise, we do not use the actual numbers from the Employer–Employee register but plant and firm
numbers used by Statistics Norway and added to the Employer–Employee register by them.
18The original person identification number both in the white- and blue-collar data sets and in all national
administrative registers is the individuals’ social security number. When preparing the various data sets for
research use, Statistics Norway recodes the social security numbers in order to preserve anonymity. The link file
between the original series and the recoded personal identification numbers used in our data sets is maintained
by Statistics Norway only.
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explained in Section 3.1, white-collar workers have their wages mainly set at the firm or plant
level, whereas blue-collar workers’ wages are mainly set by central bargaining. Robustness
tests will be presented where we use plant-level results instead of firm-level results. Recall
also that firms included in our analysis have more than 25 workers in each year. This means
that we are assessing relatively large firms by Norwegian standards.
5.1 Wage structure in Norway
5.1.1 Wage dispersion for workers 1980–1997
Figures 3 and 4 depict the development of average wage by presenting the average wage and
the 90th, 75th, 25th and 10th percentiles from 1981 to 1997. When we consider white-collar
workers alone, we notice that the overall real wage increase has been about 20% in the period.
Blue-collar workers’ wages have had a similar increase. Noticeable in both cases is a slight
increase in real wages around 1985 and then a drop in the late 1980s due to the wage freeze at
5% nominal rises in 1988 and 1989. Real wages started to rise again in the 1990s. The different
portions of the wage distribution basically follow the same pattern, and wage dispersion did
not increase in this period either within the group of white-collar workers or for all workers
taken together. A rather stable wage distribution is also confirmed by the estimated kernel
densities presented in Figure 5 and for both white- and blue-collar workers in Figures 6, 7
and 8. The results confirm previous findings (Salvanes et al., 1999; Aaberge et al., 2000)
of no increase in wage dispersion in Norway in this period,19 and differs substantially from
the development in other OECD countries and notably for other Scandinavian countries (see
Edin et al., 2005 and Oyer, 2005 for Sweden; and Uusitalo and Vartianen, 2005 for Finland).
From Figure 7 and 8 we see that there is more wage variance among white collar workers
than among blue collar workers. This is to be expected since white collar workers include
high wage management as well as low-end staff positions. In addition, the wage of white
collar workers is mainly determined locally (so-called wage drift) while the wage of blue collar
workers is mainly determined though centralized collective agreements. See section 3.1 for
more about this. Hence white collar wages are more strongly influenced by firm heterogeneity.
In Table I in the Appendix, we present more detailed measures for the structure of wage
levels for white-collar workers.20 In Table II in the Appendix the same type of results are
presented for white- and blue-collar workers in the machinery and equipment industry (Sector
38). In these tables, we also report the wage distribution by age. From the lower panel of Table
I, we see that older white-collar workers (age 45–50) have a higher wage level than younger
workers (age 25–30) as expected but also higher wage dispersion than younger workers. This
19There is some evidence that wage dispersion increased in the late 1990s. See Faggio et al. (2005), using
earnings data going beyond 1997.
20Table XII presents the same numbers at plant level instead of firm level.
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Figure 3: log monthly wage for white-collar workers in the private sector.
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Figure 4: log monthly wage for workers in the machinery and equipment industry (Sector
38).
9.
5
10
10
.5
9.
5
10
10
.5
1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997
1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997
All workers Blue collar workers
White collar workers
mean 10th percentile
25th percentile 75th percentile
90th percentile
year
Graphs by All workers/Blue collar workers/White collar workers
18
Figure 5: Kernel densities for white-collar workers in the private sector.
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Figure 6: Kernel densities for both blue- and white-collar workers in the machinery and
equipment industry (Sector 38).
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Figure 7: Kernel densities for workers in the machinery and equipment industry (Sector 38).
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Figure 8: Kernel densities for workers in the machinery and equipment industry (Sector 38)
by year.
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implies that pay for unobserved characteristics is correlated with the age of the workers.
Both groups seem to follow a similar pattern of wage increases over time, but wage dispersion
appears to be increasing for older workers.
5.1.2 Within and between firm wage dispersion
In this section, we assess the variation of wages at the firm level. Is the modest and stable
overall wage dispersion in Norway representative for all firms or are there large differences in
wage structure across firms? From the institutional setting we would expect that centralized
wage setting induces very similar wage structures across firms, but we also know that wage
drift is important (see Figure 2), particularly for white-collar workers. In addition, we know
that technological change, increased international trade and outsourcing are distributed un-
equally across firms. These forces have been as important in Norway as in most other countries
and may lead to differences in wage dispersion across firms (Salvanes and Førre, 2003). Such
possible differences may of course reflect different factors such as productivity differences,
differences in wage policy or differences in the composition of the workforce.
Recall that the average wage increase is about 20% for white-collar workers in the period
we are analyzing. In Figure 9, we present the real wage increase at the firm level for both
the mean wage level and different parts of the distribution. We see that the wage increase
has been very similar for different parts of the wage distribution of firms. This implies that
there has not been any increased wage dispersion across firms over time in Norway. More
detailed results, and results for blue- and white-collar workers together in the machinery and
equipment industry can be found in Tables III and IV in the Appendix.
In order to further assess the wage structures within and between firms, we decompose
the wage structure. These results are presented in Figure 10 for white-collar workers only
and in Figure 11 for blue- and white-collar workers in the machinery and equipment industry
(Sector 38). Corresponding numbers are given in Tables IX and X in the Appendix.21 As
expected, only 15–20% of the wage variation for white-collar workers are between firms. Thus,
must of the wage dispersion in Norway is within firms. It is important to note, however, that
there was a slight increase in the magnitude of firm wage differences at the end of the period
(see also Figure 13, below). Somehow, the firms became more different over time. Turning
to the results for both white- and blue-collar workers in the same firms, we notice in Figure
11 that there is a big difference between white- and blue-collar workers and between sectors.
First, the total variance is, as expected, much larger for white-collar workers within the same
sector. Second, the total variance for white-collar workers is also, as expected, lower within
the machinery and equipment industry (Sector 38) than when private services are included
as in Figure 10. Hence, because there is less variance within the machinery and equipment
21Table XIII gives the numbers for white-collar workers where we use plants instead of firms.
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Figure 9: Mean of firm mean log monthly white-collar wage in the private sector.
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industry and because blue-collar workers are in the majority here, the total variance for both
groups taken together is lower than the results shown for white-collar workers only in Figure
11. However, again the within-firm part dominates the between-firm part, and there is a
slight increase in the between-firm part at the end of the period. One slightly puzzling result,
however, is that when we compare the between-firm part for blue- and white-collar workers
separately within the machinery and equipment industry (Sector 38), the between-firm part
is far bigger for blue-collar workers than for white-collar workers (see the details in Table X
in the Appendix). Since firm level negotiations are much more important for white-collar
workers than for blue-collar workers, we would have expected the opposite. As can be seen
from Figure 2, the wage drift part is also very important for blue-collar workers, so this may
partly explain the puzzle.
In order to test whether the increased between-firm component for white-collar workers
is due to changes in the worker composition on observables, we show the decomposition of
the residual wage distribution in Figure 12 after controlling for type of education, gender and
age in a Mincer wage equation estimated annually (corresponding numbers are given in Table
IX in the Appendix). Two important findings are evident. We basically get the same result
in the first part of the period. Between-firm wage dispersion accounts for about 17% of the
total dispersion. However, controlling for compositional changes, the increase in the wage
dispersion across firms at the end of the period completely disappears. This is made even
clearer in Figure 13, where we report the ratio of the between-firm and total variation. The
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Figure 10: Decomposition of log monthly wages for white-collar workers in the private sector.
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Figure 11: Decomposition of log monthly wage for workers in the machinery and equipment
industry (Sector 38).
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large increase in differences in wages due to changes in the workforce composition started
in the beginning of the large downturn of the Norwegian economy in the late 1980s. The
finding of relatively strong compositional changes in Norwegian firms in this period is also
supported by other studies that assess reallocation of jobs and workers (Salvanes and Førre,
2003). Salvanes and Førre find that the bulk of reallocation of jobs is between firms within
5-digit sectors, indicating that structural change at this level has been important in explaining
the change in the composition of workers in the firms. The change has been connected to
increased technological change and increased international trade.
Figure 12: Decomposition of residuals from Mincer-equations for white-collar workers in the
private sector.
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It is interesting to compare our results with other Scandinavian countries that have dif-
ferent wage setting institutions. Sweden started out with centralized wage bargaining like
Norway’s, but in the early 1980s, it basically decentralized wage bargaining to the industry
level and, unlike Norway, did not recentralize. Finland has had partly decentralized wage bar-
gaining at the industry level since the early 1980s, and, as in Norway, plant-level bargaining
has been important over the whole period. When we compare total wage dispersion and the
importance of the firm level in determining wages, Norway is very similar to Sweden in the
1980s, when the wage bargaining institutions were similar. According to Edin et al. (2005),
the firm-level part constituted about 20% until about 1990, and then it increased to about
30% of wage dispersion in Sweden around year 2000. For Norway, it increased less, at least
until 1997. A similar pattern is found when controlling for sorting to explain the increased
24
Figure 13: Fraction of total variance for white-collar workers in the private sector explained
by between-firm effects.
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importance of firms in determining wages. Sorting is important both in Sweden and in Nor-
way, but in Sweden, real firm effects also exist. Finland is very different from Norway and
Sweden in that the total wage dispersion is much smaller and constant throughout the period.
Furthermore, Finland is vastly different when it comes to the importance of firm effects: the
firm effect was negligible in the beginning and explains the entire wage dispersion from the
late 1990s (Uusitalo and Vartiainen, 2005).
5.2 Firm size
Davis and Haltiwanger (1996) has shown firm size to be important in explaining wage differ-
ences. Figure 14 shows the average of log monthly wage for white-collar workers distributed
by firm size. Here we use a sample where the firm size restriction is at least 2 white-collar
workers instead of 25 white-collar workers. In line with the previous literature, we find that
wages increase with firm size. Note that the wage differences between different firm size
classes are roughly unchanged over time.
To picture the wage dispersion, we use the coefficient of variation between and within
firms.22 Figure 15 shows that wage dispersion within firms tends to increase with firm size,
22We have no controls, i.e., we look at the raw wage data.
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Figure 14: Mean of firm mean log monthly wage by firm size. White-collar workers in the
private sector.
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Figure 15: Coefficient of Variation within and between firms. White-collar workers in the
private sector.
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while wage dispersion between firms tends to decrease with firm size.23
5.3 Wage dynamics
Figure 16 presents the average log wage changes for private-sector white-collar workers. We
notice that wage growth differs strongly over the business cycle for this group of workers.
Wage growth is much higher for the two peak periods of 1985–1986 and 1996–1997 than at
the two low-point years. From 1980 to 1981, there is even a decline in real average wages. This
pro-cyclical pattern is strong and characterizes all segments of the wage change distribution.
When comparing the group of workers moving between firms to all workers (presented
in Figure 16), the results indicate that most moves are voluntary, since movers have a much
higher wage increase than the overall average for almost the whole period. Table III in the
Appendix reports the wage changes for different parts of the distribution, and we see that
the same pattern is especially strong for the 75th percentile. Again the cyclical patterns are
strong, pointing to voluntary moves.
Figure 16: Average change in log monthly wage for all white-collar workers and for white-
collar workers who switch firms in the private sector.
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Figure 17 presents the wage increases for short- and long-tenured workers. As we would
expect, workers with short tenure have much higher wage increases than workers who have
23Davis and Haltiwanger (1996) writes: “The negative relationship of establishment size to wage dispersion
[...] entirely reflects the behavior of the between-plant component of wage dispersion. [...] In contrast, the
within-plant coefficient of wage variation tends to rise with establishment size.”
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stayed with the firm for a while. Again the cyclical pattern is strong.
Figure 17: Average change in log monthly wage for all white-collar workers in the private
sector, by tenure.
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Turning to the sample of both blue- and white-collar workers presented in Table IV in the
Appendix, a pro-cyclical pattern is present but much less pronounced. This indicates that
white-collar workers are under a more flexible regime in terms of wage setting, whether it has
to do with firm-level negotiations or other factors. Results for movers and differences between
short- and long-tenured workers hold also for this group of workers.
5.4 Worker mobility within and across firms
In this section, we present patterns of worker mobility across firms, i.e., firings and separations,
as well the worker mobility rates within firms, e.g., promotions. We want to assess the
distribution of worker exit and entry rates both across groups of workers and firms and over
the business cycle. A novel feature is that we can calculate internal turnover rates and entry
rates for different occupations within the firms. We will focus on the results for white-collar
workers in the manufacturing sector and private services.
5.4.1 Worker exit and entry rates
We start by presenting in Figure 18 the development and size distribution for all firms defined
as 25+ workers both in t and t − 1 in the white-collar data set as well as for large firms
28
defined as 100+ workers, to make the results comparable across countries. Note that none of
these groups will be representative for the Norwegian economy, since firms with 25+ white-
collar workers are relatively large in Norway. However, from Figure 19, we see that the size
distribution for all firms is very stable. For “all firms”, i.e., 25+, average firm size increased
from 121 employees in 1981 to 139 in 1997. For “100+ firms” size increased from 287 to 345
employees.
Figure 18: Number of white-collar workers and employment growth for firms in the private
sector, by firm size. Large firms defined as at least 100 white collar workers.
10
0
15
0
20
0
25
0
30
0
35
0
Em
pl
oy
ee
s
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
.
2
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t g
ro
wt
h
1981 1985 1989 1993 1997
Year
All firms
10
0
15
0
20
0
25
0
30
0
35
0
Em
pl
oy
ee
s
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
.
2
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t g
ro
wt
h
1981 1985 1989 1993 1997
Year
Employment growth Employees
Large firms
In order to illustrate the patterns of worker mobility, we present in Figures 20, 21 and
22 exit and entry rates by year, firm size, and for lower and upper segments of the wage
distribution. Tables V, VI and VII in the Appendix provide more detailed information.24
24Table VIII in the Appendix provides numbers for both white- and blue-collar workers in the machinery
and equipment industry (Sector 38). Table XIV provides numbers for white-collar workers by plant instead of
firm.
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Figure 19: Kernel density log firm size. White-collar data.
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The exit rate or worker separation rate for all white-collar workers taken together is about
15% annually for all firms in our sample, and about 10% for large firms. Salvanes and Førre
(2003) using a data set without a lower limit on firm size find an exit rate around 25%. This
is only slightly below results for the US economy. The entry or hiring rate is between 14%
and 19% for all firms and between 9% and 12% for large firms. One observation, therefore, is
that the turnover rates are high for white-collar workers and that they decrease with firm size
as expected. These findings are in line with previous work using other data sets and different
parts of the firm size distribution (Salvanes and Førre, 2003). Looking at different segments
of the workforce, see Figures 21 and 22, we notice that white-collar workers in low paid jobs
have much higher exit and entry rates than workers in high paid jobs.25 Thus, low paid jobs
are more volatile than high paid jobs. Figure 23 shows the kernel densities for exit and entry
rates at the firm level. The cyclical pattern is quite interesting for worker flows. The exit
rate is quite stable over the cycle, whereas the job destruction rate that comprise one part
of the exit rate is for many countries found to be counter-cyclical (for the US see, Davis and
Haltiwanger, 1992; for Norway see Salvanes, 1997). This pattern appears to be true for all
segments of the firms. It is the entry rate that varies over the cycle in a pro-cyclical fashion.
25Low and high pay is here defined as being in the bottom or top quartile of the within firm wage distribution,
respectively. Very similar results can be found in Tables VI and VII in the Appendix, looking at high and
low level jobs rather than high and low paid workers. High and low level jobs are defined as follows: First we
calculate median wages for all jobs, then we rank all jobs by their median wage. High level jobs are those jobs
whose median wage is in the top 20% of the wage distribution and low level jobs are those in the bottom 20%.
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Looking at job creation rate only, a part of the entry rate, the standard result is that they are
stable over the cycle. This pattern also appears to be true for all segments of the workforce,
but it seems to be more pronounced for the lower-level jobs.
In Table V in the Appendix, we see that entry rates are positively correlated with wage
growth, suggesting that growing firms raise wages to attract new workers. Somewhat surpris-
ingly, the relationship between wage growth and the worker exit rates is much weaker. One
would expect wage growth to be negatively correlated with the exit rate, and to some extent
this is so for low level jobs. For workers in high level jobs, however, Table VI show that there
is significant, positive correlation between wage growth and exit rates. One explanation could
be that managers in successful firms get attractive outside offers. Within firm wage dispersion
does not seem related to exit rates, nor to entry rates with one exception. For high level jobs,
there is significant positive correlation between wage dispersion and entry.
Figure 20: Firm level exit and entry rates. White-collar workers in the private sector. Large
firms defined as at least 100 white collar workers.
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5.4.2 Internal worker dynamics
Since we have information on the internal structure of the firms’ labor market, we can assess
the internal worker turnover rates. Two measures will be presented: internal turnover rates
across occupations and the share hired from within the firm.26 We look at 22 different
26See Hunnes et al. (2003) for more details on this.
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Figure 21: Firm level exit rates. White-collar workers in the private sector. Split by
top/bottom quartile of the within firm wage distribution. Large firms defined as at least
100 white collar workers.
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Figure 22: Firm level entry rates. White-collar workers in the private sector. Split by
top/bottom quartile of the within firm wage distribution. Large firms defined as at least 100
white collar workers.
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Figure 23: Kernel densities for firm level exit and entry rates. White-collar workers in the
private sector.
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occupations, cf Section 4.1.1. The number of occupations represented in each firm has been
stable over the period. The average is 13 for all firms and 16 for large firms. The number
of hierarchical levels has also been stable over time. The average is 6 for all firms and 6.8
for the 100+ firms. The number of levels appears to be larger for Norwegian firms than the
figure Oyer (2005) reports for Swedish firms.
Figure 24 shows that about 10% of the workers switch jobs internally. The number of
new jobs filled internally is about 40% for all white-collar workers. The numbers are similar
across different firm sizes. Tables V, VI and VII in the Appendix present further details. The
number of internally filled jobs is much lower at the lower end of the job-level distribution.
We would expect that those jobs are filled externally, since the ports of entry jobs are at the
bottom. In Table VIII in the Appendix, we report results for blue- and white-collar workers
together in the machinery and equipment industry. Blue-collar workers comprise the bulk of
the jobs since the data are from the manufacturing sector. The external turnover rates are
much the same as for white-collar workers. The internal rates are quite different, being also
half the rate of white-collar workers. The percentages of jobs filled internally are also much
lower. Blue-collar jobs are primarily filled externally.
Figure 24: Percentage of employees who switch jobs internally and percentage of jobs filled
internally. White-collar workers in the private sector. Large firms defined as at least 100
white collar workers.
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6 Concluding remarks
To what extent do different firms follow different wage policies? Do such differences relate to
how workers move between firms? What are the effects of different wage bargaining regimes?
The aim of this paper has been threefold. First, to describe the Norwegian wage setting
and employment protection institutions. Next, to describe data sets available for empirical
analysis, and finally to document stylized facts about the wage structure and the worker
mobility patterns in Norway. We analyze within and between firm wage differences and
worker entry and exit rates in the period 1980–1997. Norway is an interesting case to study
for several reasons. The Norwegian economy is very open, but wage dispersion in Norway
has remained low while most OECD countries have experienced a strong increase. Also,
certain labor market institutions are different from other European countries. Most notably,
centralized wage bargaining is quite important. Differences in wage bargaining institutions
between white- and blue-collar workers within Norway, provide an additional dimension for
comparison.
Norway is a high wage country. Average monthly white-collar wage in the early 1990s was
about NOK 20,000, the equivalent of 2,500 EURO. Average monthly wage across both blue-
and white-collar workers in the machinery and equipment industry was about NOK 17,000.
Real white-collar wages grew 18% over the 16 year period 1981-1997. Wage dispersion was
low and stable with a coefficient of variation for white-collar workers of 31.8% in 1981 and
32.4% in 1997, i.e. the standard deviation of white-collar wages was less than a third of
the wage level. Country studies from Finland, Germany, Italy, Sweden and Denmark find
coefficients of variation in wages in the interval 33–41%. We find that wage dispersion among
blue-collar workers is much smaller than wage dispersion among white-collar workers. This
is to be expected, as blue-collar workers is a much more homogeneous group.
An important question we have analyzed is to what extent firms differ in their wage
setting. Numerous economic models portraits all firms as similar, using the “representative
firm” metaphor. How far from the truth is this simplification? We find that most of the wage
variation in Norway is within firms. The average standard deviation of wages within firms
is 79% of the overall standard deviation. Still, firms vary considerably in their average wage
level. The standard deviation of average firm wages is about 13% of the overall average wage,
and between firm wage variation represents 17–23% of the overall wage variation. The between
share has increased over time, suggesting that firms are becoming somewhat more dissimilar.
This development is related to changes in the workforce composition and disappears when
observable worker characteristics are controlled for.
The correlation between the firm’s average wage and the standard deviation of wages
within the firm, is positive and significant, both when we look at the wage level and the log
of wages. Hence, high wage firms have larger within firm wage dispersion than low wage
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firms. Whether this is because high wage firms are more heterogeneous with respect to the
composition of the work force or because high wage firms follow a different wage policy, is an
interesting and important question that we will pursue in future work.
Firms may differ not only with respect to average wage and wage dispersion, but also
with respect to average wage growth. Looking into this, we find some heterogeneity. The
interquartile range in average wage growth across firms is 3–4 percentage points in the 1980s,
and about 2 percentage points in the 1990s. These numbers are for white-collar workers.
Wage growth is strongly procyclical. When looking at the sample of both blue- and white-
collar workers in the machinery and equipment industry, however, the procyclical pattern is
less pronounced. This might be related to centralized wage bargaining being more important
for blue-collar workers. Workers who change firms have above average wages growth in all
years. This finding suggests that there are more voluntary moves than layoffs, even during
economic downturns.
In our sample, dominated by relatively large firms, about 15% of the workers leave their
employer each year. This is a fairly low number compared to other countries. A previous
study for Norway, using the entire universe of firms, have found the exit rate to be about 25%.
We find that the exit rate is very stable over the business cycle. This may seem surprising,
but it is in line with previous studies suggesting that higher job destruction rates in bad years
are counter-acted by less voluntary job changes. The entry rate, on the other hand, is highly
procyclical, and varies between 14–19%. Previous studies suggest that this is driven by more
voluntary job changes is good years while the job creation rates are fairly stable over the
cycle. Entry and exit rates are much higher for workers in low level jobs than for workers in
high level jobs. Hence, low level jobs have on average a shorter duration.
There is substantial heterogeneity in entry and exit rates across firms. Some of this
heterogeneity is explained by firm characteristics. First, we find that entry and exit rates
are smaller in large firms than in small firms. Obviously, large internal labor markets offer
better career opportunities within firms. Second, entry rates are positively correlated with
wage growth, suggesting that growing firms raise wages to attract new workers. Somewhat
surprisingly, the relationship between wage growth and the worker exit rates is much weaker.
One would expect wage growth to be negatively correlated with the exit rate, and to some
extent this is so for low level jobs. For workers in high level jobs, however, there is significant,
positive correlation between wage growth and the exit rate. One explanation could be that
managers in successful firms get attractive outside offers.
Having information about the internal structure of firms’ labor markets, we are not re-
stricted to analyzing worker mobility across firms. Looking at within firm job mobility, we
find that about 10% of white-collar workers change occupation each year. Occupations are
broadly defined in our data, hence, these workers should experience a significant shift in their
job content. The share of workers changing occupation internally is similar for small and large
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firms, and the number is also stable over the business cycle. The share of new white-collar
jobs filled internally varies between 35 and 46%. There is more external hiring in good years.
Consistent with the hypothesis that low level jobs are “ports of entry” into the firms, we find
that the share of jobs filled internally is much lower for low level jobs than for high level jobs.
The difference is particularly large in large firms. Among blue-collar workers, the share of
workers who change occupation within firms is much lower than for white-collar workers. The
share of new jobs filled internally is also much lower.
Future work on the Norwegian data should go deeper into the importance of sorting, and
clarify further to what extent different wage structures reflect differences in the workforce
composition and to what extent it reflect managerial choices. How has sorting of workers
developed over time and what are possible driving forces? How do different managerial
choices with respect to wage policy affect firm productivity? A related issue is the effect of
technological change and innovativeness on the wage structure. Finally, there is more work
to be done on the effect of different wage bargaining regimes, exploiting differences between
blue- and white-collar workers, different sectors and different time periods.
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Table I: Structure of wages within and between firms. White-collar workers in the private
sector.
Monthly wage log monthly wage
1981 1986 1993 1997 1981 1986 1993 1997
Average wage 18,259 19,694 20,001 21,855 9.768 9.840 9.858 9.945
sd 5,810 6,560 6,455 7,072 0.293 0.305 0.296 0.300
90%-ile 25,872 28,934 29,175 31,959 10.161 10.273 10.281 10.372
10%-ile 12,231 13,090 13,447 14,625 9.412 9.480 9.507 9.590
N-workers 56,838 73,600 76,449 79,259 56,838 73,600 76,449 79,259
Average of firm average wage 17,226 18,201 18,677 20,395 9.713 9.766 9.791 9.879
sd 2,350 2,404 2,656 2,977 0.135 0.130 0.135 0.141
90%-ile 20,114 21,231 22,023 24,360 9.875 9.926 9.962 10.061
10%-ile 14,042 15,114 15,601 16,686 9.525 9.596 9.622 9.697
N-firms 467 506 521 565 467 506 521 565
Average of sd of wage 4,568 5,006 5,121 5,566 0.249 0.255 0.253 0.252
sd 1,206 1,381 1,653 1,641 0.048 0.053 0.051 0.048
90%-ile 6,125 6,713 6,852 7,421 0.302 0.312 0.310 0.308
10%-ile 2,999 3,356 3,537 3,744 0.194 0.200 0.197 0.198
N-firms 467 506 521 565 467 506 521 565
Average Coefficient of
variation of wage 0.263 0.273 0.271 0.270 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026
sd 0.050 0.055 0.061 0.057 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
90%-ile 0.323 0.341 0.339 0.334 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.031
10%-ile 0.197 0.208 0.204 0.204 0.020 0.021 0.020 0.020
N-firms 467 506 521 565 467 506 521 565
Corr(average wage, sd wage) 0.738 0.732 0.727 0.726 0.203 0.155 0.364 0.333
Significance level 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Average wage for workers
between 25 and 30 15,486 16,984 16,304 17,630 9.627 9.716 9.679 9.757
sd 3,179 3,795 3,282 3,547 0.201 0.216 0.200 0.201
90%-ile 19,725 22,120 20,564 22,202 9.890 10.004 9.931 10.008
10%-ile 11,774 12,626 12,483 13,386 9.374 9.444 9.432 9.502
N-workers 7,378 11,628 10,833 9,123 7,378 11,628 10,833 9,123
Average wage for workers
between 45 and 50 19,970 21,352 21,368 23,262 9.858 9.920 9.919 10.003
sd 6,291 7,182 7,327 7,845 0.290 0.305 0.312 0.316
90%-ile 28,747 32,092 31,592 34,461 10.266 10.376 10.361 10.448
10%-ile 13,576 14,309 14,094 15,250 9.516 9.569 9.554 9.632
N-workers 7,231 9,031 14,641 13,962 7,231 9,031 14,641 13,962
The numbers are real wages, transformed from nominal wages using the Consumer Price Index
from Statistics Norway with base year 1990.
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Table II: Structure of wages within and between firms. All workers in the machinery and
equipment industry (Sector 38).
Monthly wage log monthly wage
1987 1993 1997 1987 1993 1997
Average wage 16,328 16,989 18,311 9.673 9.710 9.779
sd 4,241 4,586 5,374 0.227 0.236 0.261
90%-ile 21,487 22,805 25,364 9.975 10.035 10.141
10%-ile 12,664 12,938 13,873 9.447 9.468 9.538
N-workers 24,268 26,805 25,446 24,268 26,805 25,446
Average of firm average wage 15,436 15,930 16,877 9.620 9.649 9.703
sd 1,621 1,807 2,010 0.097 0.104 0.109
90%-ile 17,625 18,629 19,383 9.755 9.814 9.847
10%-ile 13,583 14,123 14,787 9.508 9.544 9.585
N-firms 119 149 139 119 149 139
Average of sd of wage 3,278 3,549 4,026 0.185 0.191 0.212
sd 1,027 1,142 1,219 0.044 0.047 0.044
90%-ile 4,734 4,910 5,464 0.251 0.259 0.274
10%-ile 2,057 2,201 2,487 0.131 0.136 0.153
N-firms 119 149 139 119 149 139
Average Coefficient of
variation of wages 0.210 0.220 0.236 0.019 0.020 0.022
sd 0.052 0.056 0.054 0.005 0.005 0.004
90%-ile 0.278 0.297 0.309 0.026 0.026 0.028
10%-ile 0.141 0.149 0.169 0.014 0.014 0.016
N-firms 119 149 139 119 149 139
Corr(average wage, sd wage) 0.718 0.690 0.762 0.501 0.489 0.447
Significance level 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Avgerage wage for workers
between 25 and 30 15,642 15,650 16,571 9.642 9.643 9.701
sd 2,935 2,836 2,999 0.175 0.171 0.165
90%-ile 19,744 19,658 20,284 9.891 9.886 9.918
10%-ile 12,689 12,671 13,606 9.448 9.447 9.518
N-workers 3,299 4,654 3,781 3,299 4,654 3,781
Average wage for workers
between 45 and 50 17,211 17,888 19,338 9.723 9.755 9.831
sd 4,678 5,341 5,959 0.236 0.259 0.268
90%-ile 23,035 24,954 27,825 10.045 10.125 10.234
10%-ile 13,151 13,200 14,155 9.484 9.488 9.558
N-workers 3,102 4,474 3,988 3,102 4,474 3,988
The numbers are real wages, transformed from nominal wages using the Consumer
Price Index from Statistics Norway with base year 1990.
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Table III: Wage dynamics for white-collar workers in the private sector.
∆ monthly wage ∆ log monthly wage
1981 1986 1993 1997 1981 1986 1993 1997
Average change in wage -93 903 329 709 -0.004 0.047 0.016 0.032
sd 1,228 1,263 1,430 1,488 0.065 0.061 0.054 0.068
90%-ile 1,276 2,274 1,241 2,057 0.074 0.116 0.064 0.093
10%-ile -1,226 -79 -308 -131 -0.066 -0.005 -0.018 -0.007
N-workers 49,975 60,499 68,162 69,210 49,975 60,499 68,162 69,210
Average of firm average
change in wage -171 820 246 623 -0.008 0.046 0.013 0.030
sd 627 471 369 494 0.036 0.027 0.019 0.023
90%-ile 514 1,396 666 1,186 0.031 0.075 0.034 0.057
10%-ile -849 267 -176 120 -0.050 0.016 -0.010 0.006
N-firms 467 506 521 565 467 506 521 565
Average of sd of
change in wage 955 1,001 892 1,198 0.052 0.053 0.047 0.059
sd 399 464 823 777 0.024 0.028 0.028 0.037
90%-ile 1,381 1,499 1,434 2,019 0.076 0.077 0.078 0.095
10%-ile 552 562 373 503 0.029 0.031 0.021 0.026
N-firms 467 506 521 565 467 506 521 565
Average change in wage for
workers who change firms 242 1,644 533 1,091 0.015 0.081 0.025 0.050
sd 1,838 2,403 1,708 2,141 0.098 0.117 0.075 0.099
90%-ile 2,405 4,414 2,128 3,424 0.132 0.220 0.100 0.157
10%-ile -1,512 -465 -443 -215 -0.068 -0.026 -0.021 -0.011
N-workers 1,265 814 2,688 2,842 1,265 814 2,688 2,842
Average change in wage for
workers with tenure < 3 205 1,215 549 1,000 0.014 0.067 0.028 0.048
sd 1,342 1,434 1,260 1,712 0.075 0.075 0.064 0.085
90%-ile 1,750 2,788 1,726 2,808 0.105 0.151 0.091 0.135
10%-ile -1,109 -32 -300 -137 -0.062 -0.002 -0.016 -0.007
N-workers 4,766 13,314 10,626 10,829 4,766 13,314 10,626 10,829
Average change in wage for
workers with tenure ≥ 3 -170 815 289 655 -0.009 0.041 0.014 0.029
sd 1,156 1,196 1,454 1,436 0.059 0.055 0.051 0.063
90%-ile 1,116 2,085 1,128 1,873 0.060 0.103 0.058 0.084
10%-ile -1,236 -84 -310 -131 -0.068 -0.005 -0.019 -0.007
N-workers 25,065 46,834 57,469 58,295 25,065 46,834 57,469 58,295
Wage change is wage in year t minus wage in year t− 1.
The numbers are real wages, transformed from nominal wages using the Consumer Price Index from
Statistics Norway with base year 1990.
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Table IV: Wage dynamics for all workers in the machinery and equipment industry (Sector
38).
∆ monthly wage ∆ log monthly wage
1987 1993 1997 1987 1993 1997
Average change in wage 341 308 473 0.027 0.017 0.024
sd 1,423 1,269 1,513 0.084 0.072 0.080
90%-ile 1,686 1,402 1,822 0.112 0.083 0.097
10%-ile -1,180 -489 -506 -0.060 -0.027 -0.027
N-workers 20,401 22,957 19,489 20,401 22,957 19,489
Average of firm average
change in wage 444 175 396 0.034 0.011 0.022
sd 488 364 473 0.031 0.023 0.026
90%-ile 1,054 579 884 0.077 0.035 0.049
10%-ile -121 -178 -98 -0.004 -0.013 -0.010
N-firms 119 149 139 119 149 139
Average of sd of
change in wage 1,127 820 1,146 0.072 0.049 0.065
sd 696 656 610 0.034 0.033 0.031
90%-ile 1,678 1,417 1,956 0.102 0.078 0.097
10%-ile 598 260 473 0.040 0.016 0.031
N-firms 119 149 139 119 149 139
Average change in wage for
workers who change firms 297 346 597 0.025 0.016 0.023
sd 1,684 2,222 2,406 0.103 0.114 0.140
90%-ile 2,205 2,679 3,362 0.142 0.157 0.159
10%-ile -1,355 -1,169 -1,998 -0.084 -0.070 -0.119
N-workers 609 319 697 609 319 697
Average change in wage for
workers with tenure < 3 617 612 736 0.050 0.039 0.041
sd 1,558 1,573 1,955 0.106 0.095 0.106
90%-ile 2,398 2,234 2,403 0.181 0.141 0.141
10%-ile -1,073 -505 -545 -0.059 -0.025 -0.031
N-workers 4,488 3,272 3,289 4,488 3,272 3,289
Average change in wage for
workers with tenure ≥ 3 264 257 420 0.021 0.014 0.020
sd 1,373 1,203 1,401 0.075 0.067 0.073
90%-ile 1,492 1,221 1,665 0.099 0.072 0.085
10%-ile -1,220 -487 -492 -0.060 -0.027 -0.025
N-workers 15,913 19,685 16,200 15,913 19,685 16,200
Wage change is wage in year t minus wage in year t− 1.
The numbers are real wages, transformed from nominal wages using the Consumer
Price Index from Statistics Norway with base year 1990.
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Table V: Mobility white-collar workers in the private sector. All jobs.
All firms Firms with 100+ employees
1981 1986 1993 1997 1981 1986 1993 1997
N-firms 467 506 521 565 144 170 174 173
Employees 122 145 147 140 287 332 341 345
sd 199 294 293 304 297 453 448 491
Number of occupations 13 13 13 12 16 16 16 15
sd 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3
Number of levels 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7
sd 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
Employment growth 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.13 0.08
sd 0.23 0.20 0.46 0.27 0.32 0.21 0.74 0.38
Exit rate (all) 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.10
Exit rate 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.14
sd 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.07
Exit rate, top quartile 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12
sd 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.08
Exit rate, bottom quartile 0.23 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.22 0.17 0.15 0.16
sd 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.10
Entry rate 0.14 0.19 0.14 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.14 0.17
sd 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.14 0.13
Entry rate, top quartile 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.11
sd 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.17 0.12
Entry rate, bottom quartile 0.22 0.32 0.18 0.25 0.24 0.30 0.19 0.24
sd 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.18
% of employees who switch
jobs internally 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10
sd 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.09
% of new jobs filled internally 0.45 0.35 0.46 0.39 0.45 0.36 0.48 0.41
sd 0.29 0.21 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.18 0.20 0.22
% of workers who have
been at firm 5+ years 0.07 0.56 0.67 0.62 0.08 0.56 0.69 0.67
sd 0.15 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.15 0.24 0.20 0.23
Corr(exit rate, average wage) -0.158 -0.126 -0.061 0.008 -0.118 -0.143 0.017 0.134
Significance level 0.001 0.005 0.166 0.841 0.159 0.063 0.820 0.079
Corr(exit rate, avg wage change) 0.002 0.054 -0.010 0.132 0.006 -0.065 -0.050 0.223
Significance level 0.963 0.224 0.825 0.002 0.942 0.400 0.512 0.003
Corr(exit rate, sd wage) -0.080 -0.033 0.029 0.127 -0.061 -0.098 0.122 0.261
Significance level 0.085 0.453 0.511 0.003 0.467 0.205 0.107 0.001
Corr(entry rate, average wage) -0.099 -0.151 0.018 -0.186 0.007 -0.028 0.052 -0.136
Significance level 0.032 0.001 0.674 0.000 0.930 0.716 0.494 0.074
Corr(entry rate, avg wage change) 0.062 0.233 0.114 0.111 0.132 0.254 0.029 0.091
Significance level 0.182 0.000 0.009 0.008 0.115 0.001 0.704 0.233
Corr(entry rate, sd wage) 0.033 0.058 0.063 -0.056 0.098 0.204 0.000 -0.010
Significance level 0.476 0.192 0.152 0.181 0.243 0.008 0.998 0.891
Top and bottom quartiles are quartiles in the within firm wage distribution.
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Table VI: Mobility white-collar workers in the private sector. High level jobs.∗
All firms Firms with 100+ employees
1981 1986 1993 1997 1981 1986 1993 1997
N-firms 465 503 515 546 144 170 174 173
Employees 18 24 29 29 40 56 69 75
sd 29 81 107 141 43 133 177 245
Number of occupations 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4
sd 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Number of levels 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3
sd 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
Employment growth 0.05 0.13 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.11 0.19 0.05
sd 0.47 0.55 0.65 0.50 0.55 0.33 0.99 0.29
Exit rate (all) 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.10
Exit rate 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.13
sd 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10
Exit rate, top quartile 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.15
sd 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.15
Exit rate, bottom quartile 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.13
sd 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.18 0.14 0.16 0.15
Entry rate 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.11
sd 0.12 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.12 0.12 0.17 0.13
Entry rate, top quartile 0.07 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.07 0.12 0.15 0.14
sd 0.17 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.15 0.17 0.22 0.19
Entry rate, bottom quartile 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.10
sd 0.16 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.16
% of employees who switch
jobs internally 0.15 0.15 0.11 0.11 0.16 0.15 0.11 0.12
sd 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.13
% of new jobs filled internally 0.48 0.46 0.39 0.37 0.64 0.56 0.51 0.52
sd 0.44 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.37 0.32 0.35 0.35
% of workers who have
been at firm 5+ years 0.07 0.63 0.67 0.67 0.08 0.62 0.71 0.72
sd 0.19 0.29 0.27 0.29 0.18 0.27 0.21 0.24
Corr(exit rate, average wage) -0.132 -0.098 0.015 0.159 -0.062 -0.140 0.044 0.175
Significance level 0.004 0.029 0.728 0.000 0.462 0.068 0.565 0.021
Corr(exit rate, avg wage change) 0.108 0.101 0.139 0.079 -0.012 -0.089 0.094 0.149
Significance level 0.020 0.024 0.002 0.065 0.890 0.247 0.217 0.051
Corr(exit rate, sd wage) -0.012 0.004 0.109 0.072 -0.036 -0.030 0.063 0.170
Significance level 0.801 0.933 0.014 0.101 0.669 0.699 0.405 0.026
Corr(entry rate, average wage) -0.018 -0.014 0.151 0.120 0.045 0.050 0.018 0.032
Significance level 0.707 0.750 0.001 0.005 0.595 0.520 0.809 0.677
Corr(entry rate, avg wage change) 0.067 0.136 0.034 0.033 0.100 0.144 -0.048 -0.022
Significance level 0.149 0.002 0.438 0.437 0.235 0.061 0.529 0.776
Corr(entry rate, sd wage) 0.115 0.101 0.171 0.096 0.086 0.175 0.010 0.164
Significance level 0.014 0.024 0.000 0.027 0.306 0.022 0.892 0.031
∗ See footnote 25 for definition of high level jobs.
Top and bottom quartiles are quartiles in the within firm wage distribution.
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Table VII: Mobility white-collar workers in the private sector. Low level jobs.∗
All firms Firms with 100+ employees
1981 1986 1993 1997 1981 1986 1993 1997
N-firms 455 493 496 528 144 170 172 167
Employees 20 20 16 15 43 39 33 32
sd 29 29 32 31 42 42 50 50
Number of occupations 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2
sd 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Number of levels 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2
sd 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Employment growth -0.04 0.20 0.09 0.12 0.03 0.13 0.11 0.13
sd 0.56 0.85 0.65 0.63 0.71 0.48 0.69 0.65
Exit rate (all) 0.22 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.12
Exit rate 0.24 0.20 0.16 0.18 0.22 0.17 0.15 0.17
sd 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.17
Exit rate, top quartile 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.12 0.14 0.11 0.12
sd 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.27 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.19
Exit rate, bottom quartile 0.31 0.24 0.21 0.22 0.30 0.21 0.20 0.23
sd 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.31 0.21 0.19 0.25 0.26
Entry rate 0.20 0.29 0.17 0.23 0.22 0.29 0.19 0.21
sd 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.24 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.20
Entry rate, top quartile 0.12 0.18 0.13 0.17 0.13 0.19 0.13 0.16
sd 0.23 0.27 0.26 0.28 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.24
Entry rate, bottom quartile 0.32 0.47 0.22 0.31 0.34 0.46 0.26 0.29
sd 0.33 0.35 0.30 0.36 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.29
% of employees who switch
jobs internally 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.06
sd 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.09
% of new jobs filled internally 0.15 0.13 0.23 0.16 0.19 0.13 0.26 0.20
sd 0.28 0.23 0.34 0.28 0.26 0.20 0.30 0.27
% of workers who have
been at firm 5+ years 0.05 0.44 0.64 0.60 0.06 0.45 0.67 0.67
sd 0.13 0.29 0.31 0.33 0.13 0.26 0.27 0.28
Corr(exit rate, average wage) -0.199 -0.131 0.011 -0.081 -0.245 -0.287 0.080 -0.155
Significance level 0.000 0.004 0.815 0.062 0.003 0.000 0.296 0.045
Corr(exit rate, avg wage change) 0.036 0.019 -0.100 -0.087 0.019 -0.047 -0.141 -0.059
Significance level 0.445 0.675 0.026 0.050 0.825 0.542 0.065 0.451
Corr(exit rate, sd wage) -0.047 0.004 -0.045 -0.043 -0.123 -0.059 -0.182 -0.020
Significance level 0.327 0.927 0.330 0.350 0.145 0.442 0.017 0.800
Corr(entry rate, average wage) -0.179 -0.286 -0.122 -0.241 -0.155 -0.317 -0.221 -0.248
Significance level 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.064 0.000 0.004 0.001
Corr(entry rate, avg wage change) 0.126 0.170 0.048 0.098 0.097 0.196 0.016 0.111
Significance level 0.008 0.000 0.287 0.026 0.248 0.011 0.834 0.154
Corr(entry rate, sd wage) 0.075 0.154 0.047 -0.054 0.016 0.173 0.046 0.048
Significance level 0.117 0.001 0.311 0.238 0.845 0.024 0.554 0.540
∗ See footnote 25 for definition of low level jobs.
Top and bottom quartiles are quartiles in the within firm wage distribution.
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Table VIII: Mobility all workers in the machinery and equipment industry (Sector 38). All
jobs.
All firms Firms with 100+ employees
1987 1993 1997 1987 1993 1997
N-firms 119 149 139 55 60 65
Employees 204 180 183 379 370 330
sd 290 265 242 353 338 290
Number of occupations 11 12 12 15 16 15
sd 4 4 4 2 3 3
Number of levels 6 6 6 7 7 7
sd 1 1 1 1 1 1
Employment growth -0.08 -0.04 0.11 -0.09 0.05 0.21
sd 0.24 0.33 0.35 0.21 0.42 0.45
Exit rate (workers) 0.32 0.21 0.18 0.28 0.16 0.14
Exit rate 0.29 0.20 0.19 0.29 0.19 0.19
sd 0.14 0.15 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.09
Exit rate, top quartile 0.27 0.12 0.13 0.27 0.13 0.13
sd 0.20 0.12 0.10 0.20 0.14 0.08
Exit rate, bottom quartile 0.35 0.27 0.26 0.35 0.25 0.27
sd 0.17 0.20 0.16 0.12 0.17 0.15
Entry rate 0.18 0.14 0.23 0.19 0.17 0.28
sd 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.16
Entry rate, top quartile 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.16
sd 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.12
Entry rate, bottom quartile 0.30 0.21 0.39 0.29 0.25 0.43
sd 0.20 0.18 0.22 0.15 0.19 0.21
% of employees who switch
jobs internally 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05
sd 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04
% of new jobs filled internally 0.23 0.29 0.18 0.23 0.30 0.19
sd 0.22 0.22 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.16
% of workers who have
been at firm 5+ years 0.54 0.74 0.63 0.56 0.69 0.61
sd 0.27 0.19 0.18 0.27 0.19 0.20
Corr(exit rate, average wage) 0.009 0.031 -0.152 -0.190 -0.123 -0.320
Significance level 0.923 0.706 0.073 0.166 0.350 0.009
Corr(exit rate, avg wage change) -0.041 0.101 -0.095 -0.068 -0.213 -0.168
Significance level 0.655 0.223 0.264 0.621 0.102 0.182
Corr(exit rate, sd wage) 0.021 0.054 -0.134 -0.155 -0.216 -0.255
Significance level 0.825 0.514 0.117 0.257 0.098 0.040
Corr(entry rate, average wage) -0.097 -0.051 -0.119 -0.155 -0.326 -0.270
Significance level 0.294 0.537 0.164 0.259 0.011 0.030
Corr(entry rate, avg wage change) 0.161 0.128 0.221 0.133 0.115 0.103
Significance level 0.081 0.119 0.009 0.333 0.381 0.414
Corr(entry rate, sd wage) -0.163 0.019 -0.038 -0.227 -0.282 -0.112
Significance level 0.076 0.815 0.655 0.096 0.029 0.374
Top and bottom quartiles are quartiles in the within firm wage distribution.
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Table IX: Decomposition of log monthly wage. White-collar workers in the private sector.
Year Total Between
1981 0.0857 0.0152
1982 0.0849 0.0145
1983 0.0850 0.0135
1984 0.0884 0.0150
1985 0.0921 0.0158
1986 0.0929 0.0165
1987 0.0869 0.0147
1988 0.0879 0.0140
1989 0.0809 0.0133
1990 0.0797 0.0141
1991 0.0857 0.0157
1992 0.0865 0.0169
1993 0.0877 0.0177
1994 0.0869 0.0173
1995 0.0874 0.0182
1996 0.0879 0.0196
1997 0.0903 0.0207
Table X: Decomposition of log monthly wage. All workers in the machinery and equipment
industry (Sector 38).
All workers White collar Blue collar
Year Total Between Total Between Total Between
1987 0.0517 0.0089 0.0657 0.0049 0.0238 0.0115
1988 0.0541 0.0078 0.0689 0.0049 0.0179 0.0092
1989 0.0500 0.0084 0.0630 0.0040 0.0190 0.0099
1990 0.0451 0.0078 0.0625 0.0043 0.0166 0.0087
1991 0.0528 0.0094 0.0660 0.0043 0.0191 0.0111
1992 0.0525 0.0097 0.0664 0.0048 0.0195 0.0113
1993 0.0558 0.0120 0.0648 0.0062 0.0247 0.0160
1994 0.0549 0.0114 0.0654 0.0060 0.0187 0.0113
1995 0.0582 0.0124 0.0679 0.0063 0.0207 0.0115
1996 0.0582 0.0137 0.0668 0.0059 0.0225 0.0115
1997 0.0680 0.0158 0.0693 0.0065 0.0291 0.0114
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Table XI: The ratio between the between variation and the total variation. White-collar
workers in the private sector.
Year log wage decomposition Residual decomposition
1981 0.1777 0.1738
1982 0.1707 0.1762
1983 0.1587 0.1803
1984 0.1694 0.1752
1985 0.1716 0.1899
1986 0.1773 0.2164
1987 0.1688 0.1842
1988 0.1596 0.1590
1989 0.1641 0.1579
1990 0.1774 0.1638
1991 0.1832 0.1531
1992 0.1956 0.1674
1993 0.2012 0.1653
1994 0.1993 0.1493
1995 0.2083 0.1603
1996 0.2230 0.1712
1997 0.2289 0.1723
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Table XII: Structure of wages within and between plants. White-collar workers in the private
sector.
Monthly wage log monthly wage
1981 1986 1993 1997 1981 1986 1993 1997
Average wage 18,606 19,972 20,378 22,242 9.787 9.854 9.876 9.964
sd 5,901 6,580 6,576 7,130 0.293 0.303 0.297 0.299
90%-ile 26,376 29,280 29,652 32,344 10.180 10.285 10.297 10.384
10%-ile 12,415 13,258 13,632 14,874 9.427 9.492 9.520 9.607
N-workers 48,226 65,825 65,839 68,900 48,226 65,825 65,839 68,900
Average of firm average wage 17,770 18,658 19,068 20,776 9.743 9.790 9.812 9.898
sd 2,404 2,553 2,723 3,027 0.132 0.134 0.135 0.140
90%-ile 20,618 21,813 22,496 24,696 9.893 9.947 9.985 10.077
10%-ile 14,654 15,344 15,881 17,264 9.566 9.608 9.649 9.731
N-firms 535 613 614 688 535 613 614 688
Average of sd of wage 4,807 5,182 5,222 5,629 0.252 0.256 0.252 0.250
sd 1,303 1,452 1,774 1,727 0.047 0.053 0.055 0.051
90%-ile 6,420 6,944 7,036 7,468 0.309 0.315 0.313 0.306
10%-ile 3,150 3,410 3,406 3,657 0.193 0.196 0.192 0.189
N-firms 535 613 614 688 535 613 614 688
Average Coefficient of
variation of wages 0.268 0.276 0.271 0.268 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.025
sd 0.053 0.059 0.067 0.061 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
90%-ile 0.334 0.346 0.343 0.333 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.031
10%-ile 0.200 0.206 0.201 0.200 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.019
N-firms 535 613 614 688 535 613 614 688
Corr(average wage, sd wage) 0.718 0.701 0.693 0.692 0.261 0.198 0.369 0.337
Significance level 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Average wage for workers
between 25 and 30 15,720 17,185 16,457 17,821 9.643 9.729 9.689 9.770
sd 3,180 3,784 3,269 3,460 0.199 0.214 0.197 0.194
90%-ile 19,890 22,298 20,703 22,260 9.898 10.012 9.938 10.011
10%-ile 11,927 12,784 12,647 13,606 9.387 9.456 9.445 9.518
N-workers 6,232 10,752 9,660 8,050 6,232 10,752 9,660 8,050
Average wage for workers
between 45 and 50 20,385 21,725 21,902 23,818 9.879 9.938 9.943 10.027
sd 6,409 7,235 7,496 7,947 0.288 0.304 0.313 0.315
90%-ile 29,510 32,617 32,255 34,960 10.292 10.393 10.381 10.462
10%-ile 13,945 14,614 14,372 15,539 9.543 9.590 9.573 9.651
N-workers 6,161 7,939 12,419 12,009 6,161 7,939 12,419 12,009
The numbers are real wages, transformed from nominal wages using the Consumer Price Index from
Statistics Norway with base year 1990.
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Table XIII: Wage dynamics for white-collar workers in the private sector. Plants.
∆ monthly wage ∆ log monthly wage
1981 1986 1993 1997 1981 1986 1993 1997
Average change in wage -80 917 349 725 -0.003 0.046 0.017 0.032
sd 1,243 1,271 1,489 1,495 0.064 0.060 0.054 0.066
90%-ile 1,316 2,307 1,271 2,085 0.075 0.115 0.066 0.094
10%-ile -1,237 -80 -306 -112 -0.065 -0.005 -0.017 -0.006
N-workers 42,734 54,712 59,319 60,755 42,734 54,712 59,319 60,755
Average of firm average
change in wage -150 819 257 620 -0.007 0.045 0.013 0.029
sd 645 483 378 486 0.037 0.026 0.019 0.023
90%-ile 539 1,428 686 1,163 0.032 0.076 0.034 0.055
10%-ile -849 268 -173 118 -0.047 0.016 -0.009 0.006
N-firms 535 613 614 688 535 613 614 688
Average of sd of
change in wage 950 989 868 1,132 0.050 0.051 0.045 0.054
sd 405 479 994 729 0.022 0.024 0.029 0.033
90%-ile 1,380 1,498 1,456 1,870 0.073 0.074 0.076 0.085
10%-ile 516 532 353 482 0.027 0.029 0.019 0.024
N-firms 535 613 614 687 535 613 614 687
Average change in wage for
people who change firms 168 1,633 645 1,107 0.012 0.081 0.031 0.049
sd 1,713 2,314 1,810 2,072 0.090 0.110 0.081 0.093
90%-ile 2,149 4,317 2,345 3,303 0.123 0.211 0.112 0.145
10%-ile -1,440 -343 -390 -106 -0.066 -0.016 -0.021 - 0.006
N-workers 1,690 811 2,312 3,261 1,690 811 2,312 3,261
Average change in wage for
workers with tenure < 3 257 1,251 577 1,023 0.017 0.068 0.030 0.049
sd 1,364 1,417 1,269 1,691 0.075 0.072 0.062 0.082
90%-ile 1,862 2,812 1,742 2,802 0.111 0.152 0.092 0.134
10%-ile -1,091 -5 -277 -89 -0.060 0.000 -0.014 -0.005
N-workers 3,769 12,133 9,363 9,494 3,769 12,133 9,363 9,494
Average change in wage for
workers with tenure ≥ 3 -163 822 306 670 -0.008 0.040 0.015 0.029
sd 1,156 1,210 1,522 1,449 0.058 0.055 0.052 0.062
90%-ile 1,135 2,116 1,162 1,907 0.060 0.102 0.059 0.084
10%-ile -1,242 -93 -310 -114 -0.067 -0.005 -0.018 -0.006
N-workers 21,769 42,255 49,898 51,202 21,769 42,255 49,898 51,202
Wage change is wage in year t minus wage in year t− 1.
The numbers are real wages, transformed from nominal wages using the Consumer Price Index from
Statistics Norway with base year 1990.
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Table XIV: Mobility for white-collar workers. All jobs. Plants.
All firms Firms with 100+ employees
1981 1986 1993 1997 1981 1986 1993 1997
N-plants 535 613 614 688 134 162 169 181
Employees 90 107 107 100 215 267 262 248
sd 106 163 164 161 152 256 252 262
Number of occupations 12 12 12 12 16 15 15 15
sd 3 4 4 4 2 3 3 3
Number of levels 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7
sd 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Employment growth 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.11 0.15 0.10
sd 0.34 0.19 0.64 0.36 0.55 0.18 1.19 0.63
Exit rate (all) 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.17 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.10
Exit rate 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.15
sd 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.09
Exit rate, top quartile 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.15
sd 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.12
Exit rate, bottom quartile 0.21 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.16
sd 0.15 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.11
Entry rate 0.14 0.18 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.14 0.17
sd 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.13 0.14
Entry rate, top quartile 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.12
sd 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.14 0.13
Entry rate, bottom quartile 0.21 0.31 0.17 0.24 0.24 0.29 0.18 0.24
sd 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.14 0.19
% of employees who switch
jobs internally 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.09
sd 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.09
% of new jobs filled internally 0.48 0.37 0.47 0.40 0.48 0.39 0.48 0.40
sd 0.30 0.23 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.21 0.22 0.25
% of workers who have
been at firm 5+ years 0.07 0.56 0.70 0.65 0.07 0.56 0.70 0.69
sd 0.16 0.26 0.23 0.25 0.15 0.26 0.21 0.24
Corr(exit rate, average wage) -0.155 -0.159 0.006 0.094 -0.116 -0.165 0.005 0.076
Significance level 0.000 0.000 0.889 0.014 0.182 0.035 0.951 0.310
Corr(exit rate, avg wage change) 0.072 0.108 0.059 0.199 0.062 -0.067 -0.034 0.087
Significance level 0.098 0.008 0.145 0.000 0.476 0.396 0.661 0.245
Corr(exit rate, sd wage) -0.036 -0.038 0.028 0.136 0.053 -0.133 0.058 0.072
Significance level 0.400 0.346 0.483 0.000 0.540 0.091 0.452 0.338
Corr(entry rate, average wage) -0.079 -0.059 0.047 -0.065 0.018 -0.015 -0.011 -0.025
Significance level 0.067 0.145 0.241 0.087 0.832 0.851 0.891 0.739
Corr(entry rate, avg wage change) 0.072 0.283 0.206 0.220 0.085 0.306 0.179 0.086
Significance level 0.095 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.329 0.000 0.020 0.251
Corr(entry rate, sd wage) 0.042 0.080 0.080 0.011 0.138 0.169 -0.009 0.049
Significance level 0.337 0.049 0.046 0.779 0.112 0.032 0.903 0.513
Top and bottom quartiles are quartiles in the within firm wage distribution.
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